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The Ethical Foundations
of Blended Juvenile Sentencing
Matthew C Jennejohnt

Blended sentencing cannotp1-ovid~ all acceptab!~ approach tQ solving r!Jejuvenile
justice probkm and should tberifore be abanr;/Qnedfor more ethical alternatives.

A fter fatally shooting a complete stranger, eleven-year-old Nathaniel
.rtAhraham calm1y rerurned home, watched television, and bragged of his
crime to a dassmate. 1 During his trial this seemingly calculating killer spent
most of his time drawing picrures,Z oblivious to the import of what was taking place around him. Conservative "retributionists"> see a murderer in this
preteen. Yer progressive "reformists" claim he is an innocent victim. Advocates of blended sentencing say "both." Who is right?
In its increasing sophistication, cruelty, ubiquity, and virulence, juvenile
violent crime proves to be of paramount concern. Recenrly a high school in
New Bedford, Massachusetts, stared down a sophisticated Columbine-style
massacre. Five students, plorring the attack "like a military operation," intended to fulfill their self-given charge to "kill everyone" using explosives,
snipers, surprise tacrics, and auromatic weapons.4 The murder of rwo-yearold Jaime Bulger provides another chilling example of how rhe thirst of
today's youth for the macabre is replacing yesterday's penchant for perry
theft, truancy, and vandalism. In the Bulger case, rwo English schoolboys
1 Jennejohn, from Dousman, Wisconsin, is a senior majoring in inremational politics. He
would like to eventually become a professor of law.
1
Christine Chamberlin, "Nor Jusr Kids Anymore,~ Boston Col/~e Luu Review 42 (March

2001): 16.

' Eric D. ~nrlinger, "V. v. United Kiflgdom: Is ir a 'New Deal' for Prosecuting Children as
Adulrs?" Connecticut journal ofInrmzational Law r6, no. 1 (2001): 136.
' The terms "rerributiouisr~ and ''l'cformisr" are Rebuff's (2001).
• Jessica Helsam and Franci Richardson, "Cops: Freak Crowd Planned M=cre, ~ Bosron
Hmzld. 27 November 2001, News seetion, 1.
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kidnapped and murdered the toddler by "stomping and kicking him and by
dropping a heavy iron bar over his head.''; The only thing more appalling
than the perpetrators' inhumanity is their age--eleven and ten. The pervasiveness of juvenile violent crime compounds its specter. Although juvenile
violent crime races have decreased recently, juvenile violent crime arrests are
still twenry-one percent higher than the average of the 1980s.6 These realities,
magnified rhrough increased media coverage, have led many to call once
again for sweeping reforms of the juvenile justice system.
Juvenile justice policy has reverberated between two schools of thought
in twentieth-century America: one established by progressives around the turn
of the century and the other championed by conservatives since the 1970s.
Progressives sought for a separate juvenile justice code both to mitigate the
harshness of a system designed to punish adults and to rehabilitate youth
that they might rerurn to sociery.-ln contrast, conservarives8 hoping to curb
youth crime through punishment and deterrence responded to the arguable
failure of the progressive system of the 196os and 1970s by seeking to abolish che juvenile justice system and to cry youths as adulcs. 9 While both
approaches still retain significant numbers of supporters, a third "middleground" movement composed of people in favor of "blended sentencing"
has emerged. Blended sentencing supporters propose a mixture of che rehabilitative aspects of the juvenile justice system and the punitive aspects of the
adult system to rectify juvenile crime. 10

>Sendinge r, 124.
• Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sick.mund, jttvenile Offinders and Victims: National
&port (National Ccnrer for Juvenile Jusrice, 1999), 53· The comparison here is made using
1997 numbeiS.
' C IHistian Sullivan, "Juvenile Delinquency in the Twenry-firsr Century: Is Blended Sentencing the Middle-Road Solution for Violent Kids?" Nortbm: IliinoiJ Univmity Lzw &view
21 (2001): 2.

• Note rhat the term conservative as used here does nor necessaril~· refer to political ideolog_v. I use rhe term conse1·vativ~ ro refer solely ro rhose who seek a rerum, in some measure, ro
me preprogressive practice of rrying ju,·eniles in adulr courtS, giving rhem adulr sentences. For
a discussion of prcprogressive juvenile justice, see Erin Samolis, "Divergent Clocbvork Oranges: The Juvenile Justice S~rsrems of d1e United States and Great Britain," U11ivmiry of
Chicago &undtable 8 (2001): l.

• Ibid.
'" Chamberlin.
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This mixture creates a m~mber of questions. Is blended sentencing
morally valid, 11 considering irs ethical foundations from a theoretical paradigm?'2 Is blended sentencing just? Can blended sentencing's underlying
theory produce a just result relying upon its own implied logic? Specifically,
can blended sentencing theory combine two dichotomous paradigms, progressive and conservative, thus creating a Hegelian synthesis? Or is such
combination logically impossible, with the paradigms as Plaronic antipodes,
leaving blended sentencing a theoretic.'tl house divided?
Blended sentencing is morally invalid and characteristically unjust.
Thus, it cannot provide an acceptable approach to solving the juvenile
justice problem and should therefore be abandoned for more ethical alternatives. To present this argument, we will first discuss and rest the logic
behind the progressive and conservative paradigms of juvenile justice. Then,
we will examine rhe logic behind blended sentencing using rhe theories of
Plato and Hegel as analogies. In addition, we will analyze the ramifications
of blended sentencing for both perpeuator and sociery and will offer policy
prescriptions for juvenile justice in accordance with the findings.
THE LOGIC BEHIND TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO jUVENILE jUSTICE

In order to examine rhe moral validity of blended sentencing, we must
first ascertain the validity of its components: progressive and conservative juvenile justice. Both the progressive and conservative approaches to juvenile
justice enjoy moral validity. Their different policy prescriptions result from
different views of human nature. However, before we can discuss the validicy of the two approaches, we must first identify validiry itself.
Moral validity in this case exists if the approach's policy prescriptions
logically flow from its assumptions of human nature. Arguably, in the vein
of classical social contract theorists, human nature is the fundamental origin of any social theory. 13 For example, Marx's dialectical materialism can

" I define mqral validity simply as consistency between a theory's assumption of human
nature and thar theory's policy prescriptions. This validity is "moral" in char ir depends upon
a value judgment, in this case, of humanity.
11 For a discussion of theoretical and technical characteristics of law, see Rudolf Smmmler,
Tlu ThtOIJI ofJustice (New· York: A.M. Kdly Publishing, 1969), 3·
'' Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.
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ultimately be traced back to his conception of hlunan nature as materialist
and interest-maximizing. Human nature also provides its elementary assumption, inasmuch as law is the explicit rules and bounds of society, established and dependent upon theory. Thus, for a legal policy co be valid, its
prescriptions must harmonize with its assumption of human nature. For example, it would not follow if a legal policy viewed human narure as lazy yet
prescribed laws to correct laziness that depended upon individuals' hard
work. Prescription must match assumption.
The progressive approach to juvenile justice is predicated upon a positive view of human nature readily amibutable to Rousseau. The progressive
view of human nature mirrors Rousseau's observation that "man is naturally
peaceful and shy'' 14 by viewing children as corruptible innocents that are not
accounrable for their actions in the same way that adults are. Operating from
this Rousseauistic view of human nature, progressives established a juvenile
justice system whose primary focus was not to discern juve11ile guilt or innocence bur to discover "what is he, how has he become what he is, and what
had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career."'~ The progressive project sought to correct or rehabilitate delinquent youth by believing that such correction is possible,
inasmuch as human nature is good.
By the early 1970s, however, high recidivism rates and swelling juvenile
detention centers made such optimism seem na"ive. 16 In response, conservatives succeeded in legislating criteria under which juveniles could both be
tried as adults and be given punitive adult sentences. Such policy resulted
from the conservative a posteriori negative view of human nature. The conservative policy of punishmenr and deterrence implies that human nature is
essentially corrupt, cannot be corrected, and can only be constrained. The
conservative focus "upon the seriousness of the crime and public outcry as
the determinative factors to consider in establishing whether a child should
be prosecuted as an adulc"'- rather than upon the needs and porenrial of the

'' Chamberlin, lA
Chamberlin, 3·
'• Chamberlin, +
,- Sendingc:r, 2.

1
'
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youth subtly mirrors Hobbes's pessimistic call for a "Leviathan" to protect
men from their "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'' lives. 18
These two approaches to juvenile justice are valid, though founded
upon converse assumptions of human nature. Believing char rehabilitation
can correct any deviance from this goodness, progressives based their prescriptions on a Rousseauistic belief in the inherent goodness of human
nature. Conservatives founded their prescriptions upon a Hobbesian belief
in the inherent corruption of human nature, with only constraint and deterrence able to control this degeneracy. With prescriptions harmonious
with assumptions, both of these approaches to juvenile justice are morally
valid. Note also, both approaches are just assuming their respective views of
human nature. For instance, the progressive view's rehabilitation of the perpetrator is just to the individual (by allowing him or her a new lease on life
through correction) and just to society (by removing a threat).
Blended sentencing rests upon the assumptions that borh approaches are
morally valid. Does chis validity remain when the two approaches are blended?
THE LOGIC OF BLENDED SENTENCING: PLATONIC ANTIPODES

The "yes" answer to the question of whether blended sentencing retains
validity is best analogized by Hegel's philosophy of synthesis, while Plato's
denial of synthesis provides the best allegory for the question's "no" answer.
Hegel argues for the synd1esis of thesis and antithesis in explaining the engine driving his historical dialectic.'q On the other hand, Plato's theory of
"form" and "object," in which rhe form is perfect and the object is corrupt,
denies the conflation of thesis with antithesis (at least in material existence).
Which of the two provides the best analogy of the logic of blended sentencing? Can Rousseau and H obbes be synthesized co give blended sentencing
moral validity?
It is impossible to synthesize the progressives' "good" human nawre assumption with the conservatives' "evil" human nature assumption. Tlus is

11
Thomas Hobbes, Lroiathan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ii.
•• A treatment of the philosophical relationship between Plato and Hegd is found in W. T.
Scace, Tlu Phiwsopby ofHtgtl· A Sysmnalic £-.:position (New York Dover Publications, 1995).
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not to say that there can be no deviancy from either nature: a fundamentaJly
good person obviously can do evil, while a fundamemally evil person obvi~
ously can do good. However, deviancy is just that: a perversion of an origi~
nal constant, not evidence of thesis~antithesis cohabitation. While a person's
actions may be a ratio between the good and the evil, a person's nature is ei~
ther fundamentally good or fundamentally evil, not a mixture of both. A
true synthesis of both natures, where an individual's nature is both good and
evii,!O would not result in an equal number of good and evil acts, but rather
acts that were equally good and evil. u Following this reasoning, if all persons
are good and evil synthesized, there would be no good or evil acts, only neu~
tral acts. Obviously, this is not the case; therefore good and evil natures can~
not synthesize. Like Derridan binary pairs, good and evil coexist, defined by
the other, but can never combine. Thus, the gulf between Rousseau and
Hobbes remains.
With a dichotomous assumption of human nature, blended sentencing's
synthetic prescriptions (e.g., mixing adult incarceration with juvenile reha~
bilitative programs) do not follow. Education is the principle behind the
progressive approach to juvenile senrencing. ~l The progressives posit that
deviancy from good human nawre, caused through ignorance or under~
development, can be corrected through education and guidance. Deterrence
is the principle behind the conservative approach to youth justice: criminal
behavior, though natural, can be controlled through punishment.!.! If, how~
ever, an individual is good or evil by nature, applying both approaches' pre~
scriptions is i!Jogical. For example, conservatives would question if it were
logical to not only punish a hardened criminal but also grant him the liber~
ries and benefits of a progressive program. Ir is only logical to constrain
his behavior through pw1ishment and removal from society. If human
nature is either "good" or "evil," then sanctions against such should also be
mutually exclusive.

"" E:~ch individu:U m:1y have the potc:nti:U for the m:lXimum of either nature:, but porenri:U
docs not precipitate acrion-it is acrion wirh which the law is concerned.
" This of course assumes that one's nature is the prin1:1ry factor determining action.
" See Samolis's discussion of the Progressives' focus on guiding juvenile offender d~elop·
ment, l .

. Ibid.
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Thus, with a synthesized consequent illogically following a dichotomous antecedent, blended sentencing is morally invalid. Compounding irs
invalidity is the inherent injustice of tllis approach.
THE WORST OP BOTH WORLDS: THE INJUSTICE OP
B LENDED SENTENCING POR BOTH SOCIETY AND PERPETRATOR

To apply a combination of both prescriptions to an offender is unjust!•
to both offender and society. If human nature is fundamentally good,
the adulr-srrength sanctions of blended sentencing would counteract the
nurturing effect of the progressive approach, constraining growth by
constricting aU action. Adult sanctions would also needlessly harden and embitter the youthful subject. Should human nanue be fundamentally evil,
the progressive sanctions would undermine the constraining effect of the
conservative program, allowing negative growth by not providing enough
constraint on the offender's behavior. For example, one blended-sentencing
program sentences a young offender to the juvenile justice system until he
or she is transfered to an adult corrections facility at the age of twenty-one.l'
Asstuning evil nature, such a program is unjust to society in that it insufficiently controls a dangerous criminal -the criminal's negative impulses are
unconstrained and he or she may offend again. Assuming good nature, it is
unjust to incarcerate youth who could benefit from rehabilitation. This
is especially the case if youth are not able to employ adult-level reasoning or
are otherwise lacking development at the time of offense (which is often the
case). 26 Under blended sentencing, both society and perpetrator find themselves in a lose-lose situation. Blended sentencing is both morally invalid
and unjust and is unfit to serve as an approach to remedy juvenile crime.

" While definitions of justice are plentiful, l here refer to Blumoff's pragmatic definition
of "for [the criminal's] own good and ottrs," Theodore Y. Blumoff, "JustiJYing Punishment,"
Canadian Joumal ofLaw and]11riJpmdmtt 14 (2001): I6J.
" Chamberlin, 15.
6
' In re AbnziJam, the appeal of eleven-year-old N:~rhuniel Abraham ro a second-degree
murder conviction, th e court incarcerated the juvenile even though he did not have the
mental ability (because of his age) ro understand his Miranda rights (599 NW:td 736; see " B.
Knowing and lnrclligc:nr Waiver~).
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GETTING OuT oF THE Wooos: BLENDED SENTENCING AS A
STEP TOWARDS BETTER APPROACHES

As blended sentencing's moral invalidity illustrates, the "good" and
"evil" perceptions of human nacure provide the only foundations for juvenile
justice policy. Instead of trying to cover all the bases by applying both progressive and conservative prescriptions (and incm the unjust consequences
oudined above), we should more effectively identify which of the two approaches best firs the perpetrator in question. With "some of the primary
causes of delinquency"F now identified, we can better determine the causes
of juvenile crime. We might model Great Britain's system in which "the
court would wanr to get to the source of [the perpetrator's] criminal behavior. " :a Acknowledging that "we know that every single criminal case is in fact
different,"2'l and with the increased ability to discern the nature of the individual and rhe causes behind his or her delinquency, we can more accurately
apply either progressive or conservative sanctions. Rather than blended sentencing, we need a blended approach to diagnosis.
Such a focus on diagnosis will allow the legal system to treat causes
rather than symptoms. The current injustices will be replaced with rul ings
both effective and reasonable. Only with a more accurate and individualized
approach to diagnosing criminal causality will we preempt juvenile crime.

" Chamberlin, 9·
" Samolis, I, II.
:• Blumoff, 163.

